A plea for a more rational attitude in contemporary Daseinsanalysis

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1. What do I mean by the term ‘rational attitude’?

I hope it is not necessary to state that for me ‘a rational attitude’ is by no means equal to the attitude of measurement and calculation Heidegger speaks of in the Zollikon Seminars. For me, Daseinsanalysis is a hermeneutic endeavor and therefore I plead for a rational hermeneutic discourse in Daseinsanalysis.

In a rational hermeneutic discourse, the interpreter is not just seen as someone having ‘the capacity to receive-perceive the significance of the things that are given to it [Da-sein]’ (see Zollikon Seminars p. 41), but as someone who knows how to read and to interpret texts, who is actively questioning the texts, who is interested in differing interpretations of the same subject, who is self-reflective, open for criticism of his own interpretations and interested in learning from others. In a rational hermeneutic discourse interpretations are understood as proposals for how to grasp the meaning of a matter at stake, and the interpreter is always aware of the limited and therefore preliminary character of his or her interpretations.

From this follows that in a rational hermeneutic discourse every interpretation calls for explanations. An interpretation is explained when the arguments given for the interpretation are comprehensible for all who are able and ready to follow the chain of arguments.

A rational attitude in this sense is at the same time an attitude of intellectual integrity. I will come back to this moral aspect of a rational attitude later.

2. Why do I speak of contemporary Daseinsanalysis?

Daseinsanalysis has two founding fathers: Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss. That means there are two schools of thought labeled Daseinsanalysis, but in contemporary Daseinsanalysis the influence of Binswanger is quasi inexistent because his work is not widely read and therefore not present, except in the Daseinsanalytic

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